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et al.: Criminal Law

CRIMINAL LAW
I. EXPANSION OF "STOP AND FRISK" DOCTRINE

In State v. Chaffee1 the South Carolina Supreme Court
stretched the ruling in Terry v. Ohio 2 beyond the boundaries of

prior United States Supreme Court and state supreme court rulings. In Chaffee the "stop and frisk" doctrine from Terry was
extended to include a five hour detention at police
headquarters. 3
At trial Jonathan Chaffee and Dallas Ferrell were found
guilty of criminal sexual conduct and murder and sentenced to
death. Chaffee and Ferrell had broken into the home of an
eightyone-year-old widow and held her at gunpoint, while they
tortured, disrobed and assaulted her. Then the defendants
strangled her, robbed her home, and set fire to the house to destroy the evidence.4
When the police arrived at the victim's house, the daughterin-law of the deceased gave the police officer a description of two
men she had seen at the house earlier that day. The officers later
found Chaffee in the vicinity, and he admitted having been at
the victim's home with Ferrell earlier that day. Ferrell, who was
later found in front of the victim's house, initially denied, but
later admitted that he had been to the house with Chaffee."
Chaffee and Ferrell were then given Miranda warnings, by
the officers, but were not formally arrested.6 They accompanied
the officers to the police department for further investigation.
The officers testified at trial that at this point Chaffee and Ferrell would have been restrained if they had tried to leave. Five
hours after the police picked up the defendants, they confessed
to the murder. An arrest warrant, however, was not issued until

1. - S.C. -, 328 S.E.2d 464 (1984).
2. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. S.C. -,
328 S.E.2d 464.
4. Id. at -,
328 S.E.2d at 466.

5. Record at 971.
6.

-

S.C. at

-,

328 S.E.2d at 466.

7. Record at 988.
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after they had confessed.'
The most significant ruling in this case concerns the legality
under Terry v. Ohio of the prearrest detention of Chaffee and
Ferrell." Agreeing with the trial court's statement that the "totality of the circumstances" provided a "'particularized and effective faces [sic] [apparently basis] for suspecting [the defendants] of criminal activity,' ,1o the court held that the five hour
detention was permissible under Terry v. Ohio. The court rejected the defendants' argument that the confessions obtained
during this detention were "fruit of the poisonous tree."'" Terry
was interpreted by the court as "recogniz[ing] the rights of officers to temporarily detain suspects for investigative purposes
even though no information is available at the time as a basis for
procurring an arrest warrant."' 2 The crux of the court's analysis
was that the permissible length and method of the detention
vary according to the extent of government interest involved.
The court found that one determinant of the appropriateness of
the detention is the nature of the crime.'" Therefore, since "the
worst of crimes had been committed, the suspicion even if short
of probable cause was great."' 4
In upholding the legality of the detention, the court extended the holding in Terry beyond the apparent intention of
the United States Supreme Court. The court failed to acknowledge that a significant difference exists between approaching a
8. Record at 992.
9. The court discussed the following eleven grounds for reversal raised by the appellants: (1) the exclusion of a juror for his views on capital punishment; (2) the detention
of Chaffee and Ferrell and whether or not their confessions were fruit of the poisonous
tree; (3) the admission into evidence of video tapes of the defendants' confessions; (4)
the jury instructions regarding the voluntariness of the confessions; (5) the trial judge's
failure to define torture to the jury; (6) the inflammatory nature of the solicitor's closing
argument; (7) the prejudicial effect of the judge's failure to grant a severance, particularly at the sentencing stage of trial; (8) the trial judge's charge to the jury that the
jurors should not be governed by sympathy, prejudice, passion, or public opinion; (9) the
admission into evidence of the testimony by the State's clinical psychologists regarding
their observations of Chaffee; (10) the refusal of the trial judge to admit testimony on
the adaptability of Chaffee to prison life; and (11) the appropriateness of the death penalty under the circumstances. The court held that no reversible error resulted from the
trial judge's decision on these issues. - S.C. at -, 328 S.E.2d at 472.
10. - S.C. at -, 328 S.E.2d at 468.
, 328 S.E.2d at 467.
11. Id. at
12. Id. at
, 328 S.E.2d at 467.
13. Id. at
, 328 S.E.2d at 467.
, 328 S.E.2d at 467.
14. Id. at

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss1/8

2

1985]

etCRIMINAL
al.: CriminalLAW
Law

suspect, which is permissible under Terry, and detaining him at
the police station for approximately five hours. Terry provided
that an officer with "reasonable suspicion" could stop a suspect
and conduct a pat-down search. 5 The validity of detentions at
the police station for interrogation upon less than probable
cause was addressed in Dunaway v. New York.'" Like the defendants in Chaffee, Dunaway, a robbery suspect, was detained and
interrogated at police headquarters without being placed under
arrest.' Statements made by Dunaway during his interrogation
were used against him at trial. Holding the detention illegal and
the confession inadmissible,' 8 the Court explained: "The mere
fact that petitioner was not told he was under arrest, was 'not
'booked,' and would not have had an arrest record if the interrogation had proved fruitless . . . do not make the petitioner's
seizure even roughly analogous to the narrowly defined intrusions involved in Terry and its progeny."' 9
The court in Chaffee did not discuss Dunaway and glossed
over the real message in Florida v. RoyerY° Royer established
that although reasonable suspicion may exist to stop a suspect,
more than reasonable suspicion is required to detain him in a
police room for 15 minutes and restrict his freedom to leave. 2 '
Therefore, it would follow that more than reasonable suspicion
would be necessary to take Chaffee and Ferrell to the police station and detain them for five hours until they confessed. The
police officer in Chaffee testified that he did not have enough

15. 392 U.S. at 27.
16. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
17. Id. at 203.

18. Dunaway was detained approximately one hour before he made his first statement. Id. at 203 n.2.
19. Id. at 212-13.
20. 460 U.S. 491 (1983). In Royer the defendant, a suspected drug smuggler, was
detained and searched in a police room at the airport without probable cause. The detention lasted fifteen minutes. The court held that when the officers searched Royer, the

detention became "a more serious intrusion on his personal liberty than is allowable on
mere suspicion of criminal activity." The court later stated: "What had begun as a consensual inquiry in a public place had escalated into an investigatory procedure in a police
interrogation room, where the police, unsatisfied with previous explanations, sought to
confirm their suspicions." Id. at 503. The Court concluded that Royer was actually under

arrest without probable cause. This conclusion was based in part on the State's conces-

sion that Royer would not have been free to leave the police room if he had so chosen.
Id. at 507.
21. Id. at 499.
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information to procure an arrest warrant against Chaffee when
he picked him up on the street.2 2 Indeed, probable cause did not
exist for an arrest warrant until the appellants confessed after
the five hour detention. The United States Supreme Court has
never upheld the admission of confessions procured in the
course of a five hour detention 23 based on less than probable
24
cause.
If the court had strictly analyzed the Chaffee case under the
standards of Dunaway and Royer, instead of applying a liberal
interpretation of Terry, it should have found the detentions illegal and the confessions "fruit of the poisonous tree." Understandably, the court did not want to exclude these confessions
since it was obvious the defendants were guilty of a heinous
crime and the State probably could not have obtained a conviction without the confessions.2 5 The court erred, however, in attempting to justify the detention by an overly broad reading of
the Terry decision.26
Amy Lynn Miller
22. Record at 992.
23. For a survey of cases on illegal detention, see W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§
9.1-9.3 (1978). That survey does not include any example of a case allowing a five hour
detention without probable cause. The American Law Institute recommends a 20 minute
limit on detainment. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIONMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(1)(Proposed Official Draft 1975).
24. Since the South Carolina Supreme Court opinion in Chaffee, the United States
Supreme Court has decided another case on the issue of detention without probable
cause. In United States v. Sharpe, 105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985), the Court allowed a 20 minute
detention on reasonable suspicion. In Sharpe a Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) agent, while patrolling an area for possible drug trafficking, became suspicious of
a car and truck traveling in tandem. The DEA agent stopped the car and radioed the
state police, who stopped the truck and detained the driver approximately 20 minutes
until the DEA officer arrived. The truck was full of marijuana and the drivers of both
vehicles were arrested. The Court found the 20 minute detention reasonable, noting that
a factor in determining the reasonableness of a stop is the purpose and the time reasonably needed to effectuate that purpose. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision which would have established a per se rule that a 20 minute
detention is too long to be justified under Terry. The Court also reasoned that in determining whether a detention is too long to be an investigative stop, it is appropriate to
examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation likely to confirm
or dispel their suspicions quickly.
25. - S.C. at -, 328 S.E.2d at 466.
26. Prior to Chaffee the South Carolina Supreme Court had not ruled on a detention of this length. But see State v. Ferrell, 274 S.C. 401, 266 S.E.2d 869 (1980)(allowing
police to detain and search passengers of a vehicle whose driver was suspected of drug
dealing); State v. Gilbert, 273 S.C. 676, 258 S.E.2d 890 (1979)(allowing detention of occupants of a car matching an all points bulletin description of a car driven in a robbery); In
re Jones, 264 S.C. 286, 214 S.E.2d 816 (1975)(allowing security officer to detain youth
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MIRANDA WARNINGS HELD INAPPLICABLE TO INTERROGATIONS
IN SCHOOLS

In In re Drolshagen7 the Supreme Court of South Carolina
found a school principal's interrogation of a jdvenile in the principal's office to be noncustodial, despite the presence of two police officers during the questioning. Thus, the court sanctioned
the admissibility into evidence of the child's confession even
though it had been obtained without the administration of Miranda warnings."'
This decision represents the supreme court's first consideration of "custodial interrogation" as it applies to a juvenile in a
school setting. Because the court's analysis was limited to resolving whether the interrogation was custodial, it is uncertain how
broadly Drolshagen may be applied. The decision may signal
some departure, however, from prior case law.29 It may also reflect a reduced concern on the part of the court for the voluntariness of juvenile confessions. Thus, the decision opens the door
to confessions of dubious reliability.
The fourteen-year-old defendant in Drolshagen was suspected of committing a series of acts of vandalism during one
weekend.30 Two police officers appeared at the defendant's
carrying stolen goods across statehouse grounds until police arrived).
27. 280 S.C. 84, 310 S.E.2d 927 (1984).
28. Miranda warnings are a set of cautionary statements that police are required to
give to a suspect in their custody before interrogation, as mandated by the Supreme
Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). These familiar warnings advise a suspect that he has a right to remain silent, that if he says anything it may be used against
him, that he has the right to the presence of counsel, and that counsel will be assigned to
him without charge if he cannot afford retained counsel. Miranda warnings were created
as a prophylactic against the potential violation of a suspect's fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. While the legality of a confession depends on its voluntariness, which is determined in view of the total circumstances of the interrogation, Miranda warnings are a minimum notification to the suspect. Failure to administer the
warnings renders any confession obtained inadmissible unless the police can show that
they gave the suspect a substantially equivalent notification of his rights.
29. See In re Williams, 265 S.C. 295, 217 S.E.2d 719 (1975)(case remanded for further investigation of the circumstances of a juvenile confession given after Miranda
warnings.)
30. The defendant and a female accomplice were accused of defacing houses and
automobiles with cans of spray paint. One of the victims, an eyewitness, filed a com-
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school and requested that he be summoned for questioning. The
youth was removed from his class by the vice principal and
brought to the principal's office, where he was questioned by
both school officials in the presence of the police officers." The
defendant confessed to the act of vandalism and was later convicted by family court. He was adjudicated a delinquent and
placed on probation for a minimum of one year.
On appeal the defense claimed that under Wong-Sun v.
U.S.3 2 the juvenile's confession should have been suppressed at

trial. The defense asserted that the child's fifth amendment
rights had been violated because he had not been given Miranda
warnings prior to the interrogation.
The supreme court affirmed the lower court's holding. In a
brief decision, the court concluded that the child's interrogation
was noncustodial. The court did not discuss at length the determinative elements of a custodial situation or the specific facts of
the case. The court noted, however, that the child came to the
interrogation voluntarily and was free to leave at any time.
Quoting State v. Doby,3 3 the court stated that the mere presence
of the police officers was not sufficient to render the situation
custodial. Therefore, relying on Oregon v. Mathiason,34 which
established that Miranda warnings attach only to custodial interrogations, the court upheld the conviction.
An analysis of Drolshagen requires a discussion of two issues. The first is the extension of Miranda rights to juveniles,
and the second is the nature of a "custodial interrogation."
Although the United States Supreme Court's concern over
juvenile confessions was expressed long before the landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona,35 the leading decision affecting ju-

plaint with the police. Record at 1.
31. The extent of the officers' actual participation in the interrogation is undisclosed
inthe record.
32. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Wong-Sun established the doctrine of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," which prohibits the admission in a criminal trial of evidence obtained in
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. See generally Y. KAmsAR, W. LAFAvE
& J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 818 (5th ed. 1980).
33. 273 S.C. 704, 258 S.E.2d 896 (1979).
34. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
35. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For examples of prior decisions expressing this concern, see
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). Both decisions recognized the need to protect juveniles from coercive interrogations by barring the
resulting confessions from admission in criminal proceedings in adult courts.
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venile constitutional rights was not rendered until 1967 in In re
Gault. 6 In Gault the Court declared that juveniles must be accorded the same due process safeguards as adults when they are
involved in proceedings of a criminal nature that may result in
their loss of liberty. 37 Underscoring the Court's concern over juvenile confessions, Justice Fortas concluded: "This Court has
emphasized that admissions and confessions of juveniles require
special caution."38
Although Gault was narrowly drawn, the Court's strong language had a far reaching effect on the recognition of constitutional rights for juveniles. Either by court decision39 or by statute,40 most states required that Miranda warnings be given to
juveniles in the appropriate situation and that any confession
obtained without adherence to the Miranda requirement be excluded from evidence in both adult and juvenile courts. Many
courts now display a special sensitivity to the circumstances
under which juveniles are interrogated, increasing the burden on
the state to prove that the juvenile has knowingly waived his
Miranda rights.4 ' Far from denying children a right to Miranda

36. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). After the establishment of juvenile courts in the late nineteenth century, juveniles often were not accorded the same constitutional rights as
adults. In Gault the Court reviewed the history of the juvenile courts and the rationale
for their creation. After paying homage to the good intentions of the juvenile courts, the
Court concluded that even in a benevolent paternalistic judicial system, a juvenile defendant must be accorded firmer protection than the good will of the judge. The Court
found no reason why the unique benefits of the juvenile courts could not coexist with the
protection accorded by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court
noted that incarceration in a reform school is still incarceration. Therefore, a child who
may lose his liberty deserves no less protection than an adult. For additional historical
background, see S.M. DAvIs, RIGHTS OF JUVENILEs-THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2nd
ed. 1984). See also Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L.
REv. 1187 (1970).

37. The Court stated: "In view of this it would be extraordinary if our constitution
did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase
'due process.' Under our constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a
kangaroo court." 387 U.S. at 27-28. The Court continued: "It would indeed be surprising
if the privilege against self-incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to
children." Id. at 47.
38. Id. at 45. The Court emphasized that "'when, as here, a mere child-an easy
victim of the law-is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used.' "Id.
at 45 (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. at 599).
39. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 375, 246 S.E.2d 407 (1978).
40. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-2-102(3)(c)(I) (1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
46b-137(a) (West Supp. 1979); OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109(a) (West Supp. 1979).
41. See In re Curry, 31 N.C. App. 579, 230 S.E2.d 198 (1976), in which the Court of
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warnings, the present law seems to accord them the right with
extra vigilance, as a safeguard against a coerced confession.
While Miranda delineated a clear procedure for obtaining
an admissible confession from a suspect, it was Oregon v.
Mathiason42 which specifically determined that the right to Miranda warnings attaches only in cases of "custodial interrogations." The Court in Mathiason drew a line between the investigatory phase of routine police work, when the protection of
Miranda is not implicated, and the beginning of the adversary
process, when the protection of constitutional rights is necessary. The Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way."4 3 The literature on Miranda rights has
catalogued the following as relevant factors in determining if a
custodial situation exists:44 the nature of the interrogator, 45 the
characteristics of the suspect, 46 the time and place of the interrogation, 47 the nature of the interrogation, 48 and the stage of the
police investigation at the time of the interrogation.4 9

Appeals of North Carolina excluded from evidence, in a juvenile court trial, a confession
obtained without the administration of Miranda warnings. The court stated: "The fact
that the present proceeding is not an ordinary criminal prosecution but is a juvenile
proceeding under G.S. Chap. 7A, Article 23, does not lessen but should actually increase
the burden upon the state to see that the child's rights are protected." Id. at 584, 230
S.E.2d at 202. See also B.L.V. v. State, 426 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 1983); In re Stanley, 120
Misc. 2d 18, 465 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Farn. Ct. 1983); In re Killitz, 59 Or. App. 720, 651 P.2d
1382 (1982).
42. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
43. Id. at 494 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).
44. See Annot., 31 A.L.R.3D 571 (1970).
45. Relevant questions include the following: whether the interrogator was a police
officer; whether he was visibly armed; whether he held a position of authority over the
suspect; and whether there were more than one interrogator. An affirmative answer to
any of these questions increases the likelihood that the interrogation was custodial.
46. Relevant questions include the following: how young the suspect was; whether
he was of normal intelligence; and whether he was relatively unsophisticated. In short, a
court should determine whether he possessed any characteristic that rendered him particularly susceptible to intimidation.
47. Relevant questions incude the following: whether the interrogation took place in
a police station; whether it was conducted close to the scene of the crime (suggesting an
investigatory, rather than custodial interrogation); and whether it took place at night.
48. Relevant questions include the following: whether the questioning was lengthy;
and whether it was of an accusatory nature.
49, Of particular significance is whether the police conducted a general investigation
or one focused on a particular suspect.
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The analysis used by courts in determining the character of
a juvenile's interrogation generally reflects the same factors outlined above.50 A highly relevant and helpful analysis can be
found in the Oregon case of In re Killitz,5 1 in which the court
held that an interrogation by a police officer in the principal's
office and in the principal's presence was custodial. The court
emphasized such factors as the child's unawareness that he was
free to leave and his being questioned as a suspect, not as a witness. Moreover, the court found it unreasonable to label the
child's arrival at the office as voluntary because during school
hours a student must report to the principal's office if so ordered. In distinguishing the case from an earlier one, 2 the court
also gave weight to the fact that the offense for which the child
was interrogated was unrelated to the school and its functions.
The seven elements that have emerged from the Miranda
literature and cases, may serve as useful guidelines in reaching a
reasonable classification of the situation in Drolshagen: (1) the
nature of the interrogator, (2) the characteristics of the suspect,
(3) the time and place of the interrogation, (4) the nature of the
interrogation, (5) the stage of the investigation, (6) the juvenile's
awareness of his freedom to leave, and (7) the relationship of the
offense to school activity. The following analysis reveals the result of the application of these factors to Drolshagen.
The main interrogator of the defendant in Drolshagen was
the school principal who, admittedly, was not a peace officer and
carried no weapon. He did, however, hold a position of ultimate
authority over the child during school hours. He was, thus, a
clearly intimidating figure to a student. Additional questioning
by the vice principal increased the number of persons interrogating the juvenile. Further, the presence of the two police officers, even if they remained completely silent, undeniably
added to the coerciveness of the situation. The vice principal be-

50. See, e.g., J.A.C. v. State, 134 Ga. App. 561, 215 S.E.2d 324 (1975) (interrogation
held at suspect's home held noncustodial); In re Weaver, 43 N.C. App. 223, 258 S.E.2d
492 (1979) (interrogation by social worker held noncustodial, primarily because social
worker was not a peace officer); State v. Rush, 13 N.C. App. 539, 186 S.E.2d 595 (1972)
(interrogation in the school principal's office held custodial); Commonwealth v. Bordner,
432 Pa. 405, 247 A.2d 612 (1968) (confession made by 17-year-old in hospital to his parents held custodial, partly because of the presence of police officers).
51. 59 Or. App. 720, 651 P.2d 1382 (1982).
52. See In re Gage, 49 Or. App. 599, 624 P.2d 1076 (1980).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1985

9

SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
South Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1985], Art.[Vol.
8

37

lieved the police to be in charge, 5 and the likely conclusion is
that a reasonable person would have had a similar impression.
The juvenile was clearly under the complete control and authority of the four adults present in the room.
The defendant was fourteen years old and not a mature, sophisticated adult capable of making calm, rational decisions.
Since the school officials were entrusted with interrogating the
child, they implicitly represented the police and could not be
perceived by the child as providing advice and support. Without
any trustworthy adult to 'supplement' the child's lack of maturity, the juvenile was prey to his interrogators.
The fact that the interrogation took place on the school
premises during school hours is important for two reasons. First,
the interrogation took place away from the scene of the offense.
This was not an on-the-spot police investigation immediately
following the discovery of a crime. Hence, the interrogation did
not have this mark of a noncustodial situation. Second, during
school hours a child is placed in the custody of school officials
and must obey their dictates. Even if the child "officially" went
to the principal's office voluntarily, as the court stated, in reality
he had no choice. The child stated that he knew that if he did
not go to the office he would either be punished or dragged there
forcibly. 54 If a custodial situation is one in which liberty is limited, the situation in Drolshagenwas certainly custodial.
There is little evidence of the nature of the defendant's interrogation, but there is no reason to believe that the questioning was very lengthy or threatening.
When the police went to the school to question the defendant, he had already been identified by one of the victims and
clearly was the focus of the investigation. This was no police
fishing expedition, seeking to catch something in the murky
water. The child was questioned as a suspect, not as a witness or
informant. Thus, the relationship between him and the police
was adversarial rather than neutral.
In light of the discussion of the previous factors, the child
was clearly unaware that he was free to leave. Even the vice
principal was uncertain whether the child was free to leave with-

53. Record at 59.
54. Id. at 66-69.
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out the permission of the officers.
The offenses charged in Drolshagen had been committed
away from school property and involved no school activity or
function. The fact that some of the victims were school personnel does not make the offense school-related. Therefore, this was
not an internal school investigation. The school was simply used
as a convenient forum for questioning.
Of the seven factors considered, six seem to indicate that
the interrogation of the defendant occurred in an intimidating,
coercive environment. Most of the individuals at the scene were
under the impression that the child was not free to go unless he
was expressly allowed to do so. The investigation, thus, bore the
unmistakable signals of a custodial situation. Yet the court
failed to acknowledge these signals and allowed the confession to
be introduced at trial, giving it the dignity and reliability of a
voluntary statement.
It is easy to underestimate the importance of the decision
because, after all, the juvenile did not actually lose his liberty.
Nevertheless, even if the decision had little impact on the defendant personally, it constitutes a dangerous precedent. The decision gives the police license to use the school as a forum for isolating and interrogating a juvenile suspect, free from the
constitutional constraints of the fifth amendment. This is exactly what Gault, Haley, and other decisions have tried to prevent: rendering the naturally vulnerable child even more vulnerable to police interrogation. The reliability of such confessions is
a question that can only be left to the imagination of the child
and his interrogators.
Ziva Peleg Bruckner
III.

ACTION FOR FETICIDE RECOGNIZED

In State v. Horne56 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that an action for homicide may be maintained for the killing of
a fetus if the state can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
fetus was viable. 57 Because the court held that the Horne deci55. Id. at 59.
56. 282 S.C. 444, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984).

57. Id. at 447, 319 S.E.2d at 704.
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sion should be applied prospectively, however, an action for feticide can be brought only if the death occurred after August 17,
1984, the date of the opinion.5 8
The defendant in Horne attacked and wounded his estranged wife, who was then nine months pregnant. Although
Mrs. Home survived the attack, the unborn child suffocated to
death because of the mother's loss of blood. The autopsy report
showed that the child had developed normally and was, at the
time of its death, capable of independent existence apart from
the mother. 59
Horne was convicted in the lower court of assault and battery with intent to kill and voluntary manslaughter. The South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the assault and battery conviction, but reversed the voluntary manslaughter conviction.
The supreme court held that a viable fetus is a "person" as
60
that term is employed in the statutory definition of murder.
The court reasoned that because it had previously decided that
a viable fetus is a "person" for purposes of wrongful birth actions, 61 consistency required that a viable fetus be considered a
"person" under the murder statute as well. 2 The court also
noted that under the doctrine of "transferred intent" the actual
victim need not be the intended one. "All that is required for
murder is the mental state of malice, provided by the intent to
kill a human being, coupled with an act which caused the death
of a human being."63 The court determined, however, that this
holding should be applied only prospectively because "[t]he
criminal law whether declared by the courts or enacted by the
legislature cannot be applied retroactively."6' 4 Thus, feticide

58. Id.
59. Id. at 446, 319 S.E.2d at 704.
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 provides: "'Murder' is the killing of any person with
malice aforethought, either express or implied."
61. See Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964).
62. The court defined "viable" as "able to live separate and apart from its mother
without the aid of artificial support." 282 S.C. at 447, 319 S.E.2d at 704.
63. Id. at 446, 319 S.E.2d at 704 (citing State v. Heyward, 197 S.C. 371, 15 S.E.2d
669 (1941)).
64. 282 S.C. at 447, 319 S.E.2d at 704 (citing Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S.
347 (1964)).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss1/8

12

1985]

LAW
CRIMINAL
et al.: Criminal
Law

prosecutions can be maintained only after the date of the Horne
decision.
Lisa S. Godwin

IV.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA ARSON STATUTE
UPHELD

In State v. Leach6 5 the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the South Carolina arson statute 6
against a challenge that it violated a property owner's fifth and
fourteenth amendment rights to dispose freely of his own property. In resolving the issue, the court relied heavily on the meaning of the statutory term "malicious." The court defined malice
as hatred, ill will, or hostility toward another. This interpretation of the term limits the application of the arson statute to
situations in which the burned property embodied a property interest of one other than the individual setting the fire. The right
of a sole owner to burn his own property is, thus, not restricted.
The court also held that, for purposes of the arson statute, a
mortgagee's interest in the property is sufficient to make it
"property of another" and, therefore, to trigger the statute.
The defendant Leach had been convicted of second degree
arson and sentenced to five years' imprisonment.6 7 On appeal
Leach attacked the constitutionality of the arson statute. Agreeing for the first time to address the issue,68 the South Carolina
Supreme Court joined a long line of other courts grappling with

65. 282 S.C. 178, 318 S.E.2d 267 (1984).

66. This statute provides in part:
(B) Any person who (a) wilfully and maliciously causes an explosion, sets
fire to, or burns, or causes to be burned or (b) aids, counsels or procures the
burning of any dwelling house. . ., whether the property of himself or of another, shall be deemed guilty of arson in the second degree ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-110-(B) (1976).
67. Leach and his common-law wife were indicted for second degree arson and conspiracy. The wife was acquitted of both charges by a directed verdict. Although a directed verdict acquitted Leach of the conspiracy count, he was convicted on the arson
count. Leach's five year sentence was suspended upon service of two years' probation.
68. In State v. Hogg, 276 S.C. 226, 277 S.E.2d 592 (1981), the court did not reach
the constitutional issue raised by the defendant. The court found that he lacked standing to challenge the arson statute.
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similar problems."' Leach cited two cases from other jurisdictions in which those states' arson statutes had been held unconstitutional on the ground that they permitted indictment of one
who innocently set fire to his own property. 70 He claimed that
the South Carolina statute suffered from a similar deficiency. In
distinguishing the South Carolina statute from those found unconstitutional, the supreme court observed that the South Carolina statute required a finding of both wilfulness and malice,
while the other statutes required only a finding of wilfulness 11
In construing the meaning of malice, the court cited an old
South Carolina case 7 2 that interpreted the term as requiring ill
will and hostility "towards another. ' 73 Since under this interpre-

69. Arson as a criminal offense finds its origin in common law as a crime against the
possession of a dwelling, rather than its ownership. 5 AM.JUR 2D Arson and Related
Offenses § 1 (1962). Thus, at common law the burning of a dwelling by its owner while in
possession was not deemed to be arson. Annot., 17 A.L.R. 1168 (1922). When various
states began to codify restrictions on the burning of dwellings and to extend the restrictions to other buildings, conflicts emerged between such statutes and the rights of property owners. See, e.g., State v. Dennis, 80 N.M. 262, 454 P.2d 276 (1969); State v. Spino,
61 Wash. 2d 246, 377 P.2d 868 (1963). See also Brown v. State, 285 Md. 469, 473, 403
A.2d 788, 791 (1979).
The state may infringe on the property rights of its citizens in order to protect the
health and safety of the public under the state's police power. Such infringement, however, must be reasonably related to some legitimate state interest. While protection of
the public from fire hazards or insurance fraud may be a legitimate state interest, South
Carolina, like most states, has enacted laws specifically protecting these interests. See,
e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-180 (1976)(negligence in allowing a fire to spread to property
of another); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-125 (Supp. 1983), (false insurance claims).

70. See State v. Dennis, 80 N.M. 262, 454 P.2d 276, (1969); State v. Spino, 61 Wash.
2d 246, 377 P.2d 868 (1963).
71. The term "malice" is part of the South Carolina statute. See supra note 66. The
two statutes found unconstitutional did not require malice to be part of the act and as a
result, had been applied to the innocent burning of one's own property. See 80 N.M. 262,
454 P.2d 276; 61 Wash. 2d 246, 377 P.2d 868.
72. See State v. Heyward, 197 S.C. 371, 15 S.E.2d 669 (1941).
73. Id. at 375, 15 S.E.2d at 671. Other jurisdictions are split in their interpretation
of malice. Some invest the term with ill will and evil intent, in a manner similar to the
South Carolina court's interpretation. "A 'malicious' burning is an act done with a condition of mind that shows a heart regardless of social duty and bent on mischief, evidencing a design to an intentional wrongful act toward another without any legal justification
or excuse." 5 Am.Jun. 2D Arson and Related Offenses § 11 (1962). A similar definition
can be found in Brown v. State, 285 Md. at 473, 403 A.2d at 791, where the court pointed
out that malice clearly goes beyond mere intent. See also Fox v. State, 179 Ind. App. 267,
384 N.E.2d 1159 (1979). On the other hand, in Commonwealth v. Lamothe, 343 Mass.
717, 179 N.E.2d 245 (1961), the court held that malice may be implied from the wilful
act of setting a fire. Other courts have held that malice is simply the intent to burn the
property and that, therefore, an intent to harm is not required. In such jurisdictions
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tation it is impossible to destroy maliciously property belonging
solely to oneself, application of the South Carolina statute is
triggered only upon a showing that the burned building contained a property interest of someone other than the person set74
ting the fire.
Turning to the facts of the case, the court concluded that
the statute properly applied to Leach because the house he
burned was under a mortgage to a local lending institution. Consistent with the courts of other jurisdictions, 5 the court thus
adopted the approach that a mortgagee's lien on the property is
sufficient to render it "property of another" for purposes of the
arson statute.
The court in Leach may have overlooked a second basis for
considering the house property of another. Joint occupancy of a
dwelling with another may be a basis for making it the property
of another for purposes of an arson statute. 76 Since Leach lived
in the house with his common-law wife, her possession of the
dwelling may have been sufficient to make it the property of another within the meaning of the arson statute. Had this approach been followed, the court in Leach might have avoided
resolving the question of the mortgagee's interest.
While Leach is important in setting some limitations on the
arson statute, the decision is also important for what it did not
state explicitly. The decision implies that a person is free to dispose of his property without fear of criminal prosecution, as long
as the interest of another is not involved. Further clarification of

malice serves to distinguish deliberate burnings from mere accidental ones. See, e.g.,
State v. Scott, 118 Ariz. 383, 576 P.2d 1383 (1978); People v. Tanner, 95 Cal. App. 3d
948, 157 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1979).
74. The court in Leach stated, "The element of malice, thus, would prevent the
indictment of persons who innocently set fire to their property and who committed no
intentional, wrongful act toward another without legal justification or excuse." 282 S.C.
at 180, 318 S.E.2d at 268.
75. See, e.g., People v. Foster, 114 Cal. App. 3d 421, 170 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1981); People ex reL. Van Meveren, - Colo. _ 619 P.2d 494 (1980); People v. Ross, 41 Ill. 2d 445,
244 N.E.2d 608 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); State v. Phillips, 99 Wis. 2d 46,
298 N.W.2d 239 (1980). Other courts, however, have decided that the interest of a mortgagee is not sufficient to make the property that of another. See, e.g., State v. Crosby,
182 Kan. 677, 324 P.2d 197 (1958); Haas v. State, 103 Ohio St. 1, 132 N.E. 158 (1921).
76. See State v. Shaw, 305 N.C. 327, 289 S.E.2d 325 (1982) (arson under common
law interpretation in North Carolina). See also Annot., 17 A.L.R. 1173 (1922)(discussing
whether wife's joint possession of a dwelling is sufficient to make it property of another).
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what constitutes such an interest will doubtless be required in
the future.
Ziva Peleg Bruckner
V.

BURDEN OF PROOF AND JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR SELFDEFENSE

In three recent cases the South Carolina Supreme Court
considered issues relating to jury instructions on self-defense. In
State v. Adkinson 77 and State v. Muller78 the court reaffirmed
its holding in prior cases that if a defendant in an assault case
introduces evidence from which it can be reasonably inferred
that he acted in self-defense, the judge commits reversible error
if he fails to charge the jury on the law of self-defense. In State
v. Davis 9 the court held that there is no error in giving jury
instructions requiring a defendant to prove self-defense by a
preponderance of the evidence.
In Adkinson the defendant was convicted of assault and
battery with intent to kill. During the trial he testified that he
had injured the victim in a struggle after the victim had attacked him with a gun. The trial judge refused the defendant's
request for a charge on self-defense and denied his motion for a
judgment non obstante veredicto8 0
On appeal the South Carolina Supreme Court unanimously
reversed the trial court verdict and remanded the case. The
court, citing State v. Brice"' and State v. Taylor,82 held that the
trial court had erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the law

77. 280 S.C. 85, 311 S.E.2d 79 (1984).
78. 282 S.C. 10, 316 S.E.2d 409 (1984).
79. 282 S.C. 45, 317 S.E.2d 452 (1984).
80. Brief of Appellant at 2.
81. 190 S.C. 208, 2 S.E.2d 391 (1939). In Brice the defendant, not represented by
counsel, was convicted of assault and battery with intent to kim and of murder. She
testified at trial that she had cut the victim with a razor after the victim had assaulted
her with a stick. On appeal the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction
because the trial judge had not given a jury instruction on self-defense.
82. 261 S.C. 437, 200 S.E.2d 387 (1978). In Taylor the defendant was convicted of
manslaughter. He made no attempt at trial to raise the defense of self-defense, but the

record contained some testimony that the victim had shot and wounded the defendant
before the defendant shot the victim. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the
conviction for the trial judge's failure to charge the jury on self-defense.
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of self-defense when the "[a]ppellant's testimony raised a reasonable inference that the [victim] was shot in self-defense."83
In Muller the defendant was convicted of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. He testified at trial that he
had shot the victim only after the victim had produced a gun
and started shooting at him. 84 The defendant's counsel made a
request in the judge's chambers for a charge on self-defense, but
neither this request nor support for it appeared in the record. 85
The judge did not deliver any instructions on self-defense.
On appeal the prosecution argued that the defendant had
waived his right to appeal the judge's failure to charge the jury
by not objecting to it at trial.8 The South Carolina Supreme
Court, however, rejected this argument. The court reversed the
conviction, holding that "[t]he trial judge's refusal to charge the
law applicable to self-defense was error because appellant's testimony constituted sufficient evidence from which the jury could
87
infer that appellant acted in self-defense.
In Davis the defendant was convicted of assault and battery
with intent to kill. The trial judge's charge included the instruction that the "defendant must prove these four elements [of selfdefense] to you by the greater weight of the testimony."8 8 The
judge overruled the defendant's objection to this portion of the
charge.
On appeal the defendant argued that under Mullaney v.
Wilbur,8 9 after the defendant produces some evidence that he
acted in self-defense, the burden must shift to the prosecution
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not
act in self-defense. 90 The South Carolina Supreme Court held
that the "trial judge's instructions, considered as a whole, did
charge the jury accurately. . . ."s' and affirmed the conviction.
The decisions in Adkinson and Muller remind the South
Carolina bench and bar that a trial judge must instruct the jury

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

280 S.C. at 86, 311 S.E.2d
282 S.C. at 10, 316 S.E.2d
Brief of Respondent at 2.
Id.
282 S.C. at 10, 316 S.E.2d
Brief of Appellant at 3.
421 U.S. 684 (1975).
Brief of Appellant at 3.
282 S.C. at 45, 317 S.E.2d

at 80.
at 409.
at 409.

at 453.
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on self-defense if a defendant introduces evidence from which a
plea of self-defense can reasonably be inferred. A judge's failure
to do so constitutes reversible error whether or not the defendant requested such a charge 92 or objected to the judge's refusal
es Further, these decisions indicate that a failure
to deliver it.
to

give such a charge is not justified because of questions regarding
the weight of the evidence on self-defense9 4 or the defendant's
failure to retreat 5 These are issues to be resolved by the jury
after it has been correctly charged. The court's holdings in these
two cases are consistent with its prior decisions and reflect the
majority view.96
The decision in Davis indicates that the South Carolina Supreme Court has not altered its position that a trial judge does
not commit reversible error if he charges the jury that the defendant must bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that he acted in self-defense.9 7 The court did not explain the reasoning behind its affirmance of the trial verdict, but
cited State v. Bolton,9 s in which it had held that "[n]owhere in
Mullaney did the court hold that requiring a defendant to prove
self-defense affirmatively denies him due process."99 At the same
time, however, the Davis court formulated a suggested charge on
self-defense that does not appear to allocate the burden of proof
at all. 100

92. This was the holding in Brice, 190 S.C. at 210, 2 S.E.2d at 392, quoted in Adkinson, 280 S.C. at 86, 311 S.E.2d at 80. In Muller the trial transcript contained no record of
a request for a charge on self-defense. Brief of Respondent at 2.
93. See supra text accompanying note 10.
94. In Adkinson the State argued that the judge's failure to charge the jury was not
reversible error because "[in the view of the trial court, evidence did not support such a
charge," Brief of Respondent at 2.
95. In Muller the State argued that the judge was not required to give a charge on
self-defense because the defendant could have safely retreated from the victim instead of
assaulting him. Brief of Respondent at 5.
96, 41 C.J.S. Homicide § 375 (1944).
97. The South Carolina Supreme Court has consistently maintained this position.
See, e.g., State v. Atchinson, 268 S.C. 588, 235 S.E.2d 294 (1977); State v. Bolton, 266
S.C. 444, 233 S.E.2d 863 (1976); State v. McDowell, 272 S.C. 203, 249 S.E.2d 916 (1967).
This, however, is the minority view. The majority view requires the prosecution to bear
the burden of proving the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Mullaney,
421 U.S. at 702.
98, 266 S.C. 444, 233 S.E.2d 863 (1976).
99. Id. at 449, 233 S.E.2d at 866. In Bolton the defendant unsuccessfully appealed a
manslaughter conviction on the same grounds asserted in Davis.
100. The court recommended the following charge:
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The United States Supreme Court has not yet resolved the
issue of whether the prosecution is constitutionally required to
bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of self-defense. 1' 1 In In re Winship 0 2 the Court ruled that
"the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. ' 0 In
Mullaney the Court identified absence of the heat of passion as
a necessary element of the crime of murder, holding that "the
Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the absence of heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide
case."10 4 In Patterson v. New York, 0 5 however, the Court held
that "[p]roof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has

Self-defense is a complete defense. If established, you must find the defendant not guilty. There are four elements required by law to establish self-defense in this case. First, the defendant must be without fault in bringing on the
difficulty. Second, the defendant must have actually believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury, or he actually
was in such imminent danger. Third, if his defense is based upon his belief of
imminent danger, a reasonably prudent man of ordinary firmness and courage
would have entertained the same belief. If the defendant actually was in imminent danger, the circumstances were such as would warrant a man of ordinary
prudence, firmness and courage to strike the fatal blow in order to save himself
from serious bodily harm or losing his own life. Fourth, the defendant had no
other probable means of avoiding the danger of losing his own life or sustaining
serious bodily injury than to act as he did in this particular instance. If, however, the defendant was on his own premises he had no duty to retreat before
acting in self-defense. These are the elements of self-defense.
If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after considering
all the evidence including the evidence of self-defense, then you must find him
not guilty. On the other hand, if you have no reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after considering all the evidence including the evidence of selfdefense then you must find him guilty.
282 S.C. at 46, 317 S.E.2d at 453.
101. This issue was presented to the Supreme Court in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107
(1982), but the Court dismissed the appeal because of the defendant's failure to object to
the judge's charge during the trial. The Engle opinion did note that the "respondents'
. . .argument states at least a plausible constitutional claim." Id. at 120.
102. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
103. Id. at 364.
104. 421 U.S. at 704. The Court reasoned that since the penalties for murder and
manslaughter in Maine were substantially different and the critical factor distinguishing
the two crimes was the presence or absence of heat of passion, the prosecution was
bound under the Winship holding to prove the absence of heat of passion beyond a
reasonable doubt.
105. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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never been constitutionally required," 106 1and that extreme emotional distress is not an element of the crime of homicide in New
York, but merely an affirmative defense, which the state could
require the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the
10 7
evidence.
A recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, however, suggests that it is unconstitutional in South
Carolina to assign to the defendant the burden of proving selfdefense. In Thomas v. Leeke'0 8 the court of appeals reversed the
district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus to Sarah
Thomas, who had been convicted of murder in a South Carolina
court. The court professed to be stopping short of resolving "the
question of whether the due process clause prohibits in al instances the placing on the defendant of the burden of persuasion
with regard to self-defense."10 9 The Court did hold, however,
that the trial judge's instructions in Thomas, which required the
prosecution to prove unlawfulness and malice beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant to prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence, "were so inherently contradictory and
confusing as to rise to the level of constitutional infirmity." 10
Thus, under Thomas jury instructions are constitutionally defective if they assign to the prosecution the burden of proving
malice and unlawfulness, as they must in South Carolina murder
and assault cases," 1 and assign to the defendant the burden of

106. Id. at 210.
107. Id. at 206-07. The Court provided no clear guidelines for determining what

constitutes an element of the crime and what may be classified as an affirmative defense.
108. 725 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1984).

109. Id. at 250.
110. Id. at 252. The court observed that it had previously "equated unlawfulness
with the 'absence of self-defense' and that 'self-defense is wholly inconsistent with malice.'" Id. at 251 [citations omitted].
111. Malice aforethought is a statutory element of the crime of murder in South
Carolina. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (1976). Although unlawfulness is not a statutory element of murder, the court of appeals in Thomas observed that "to be a crime an act
must be unlawful. . .," 725 F.2d at 251 n.4, and rejected the "distinction, pressed by the
state and the district court, between unlawfulness as an element of the crime and unlawfulness as a descriptive legal conclusion." Id. In South Carolina assault and battery with
intent to kill "contains all of the elements of murder except the actual death of the
person assault." State v. Self, 225 S.C. 267, 270, 82 S.E.2d 63, 64 (1954). Assault and
battery of a high and aggravated nature and simple assault both contain the element of
unlawfulness. State v. Cunningham, 253 S.C. 388, 391, 171 S.E.2d 159, 160 (1969).
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proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence.1 12
In the three South Carolina Supreme Court cases examined,
the court indicated that it intends to adhere to its previous decisions on the issues presented. In Adkinson and Muller it reaffirmed its position that if a defendant in an assault case presents
any evidence from which self-defense can reasonably be inferred,
the judge is required to charge the jury on self-defense, whether
or not the defendant requests such a charge and regardless of
the weight of the evidence supporting self-defense. In Davis the
court continued to assert that it is not reversible error for a
judge's charge to require that the defendant bear the burden of
proof on self-defense. If judges continue to instruct juries that
this burden rests on the defendant, however, convictions will
probably be reversed and remanded upon application to federal
courts for collateral relief. It is uncertain how the Fourth Circuit
would resolve a case in which a judge gave a charge like the one
suggested in Davis," 3 which does not explicitly allocate the burden of proving self-defense to either party. The appeals court
might find that this charge still is so inherently confusing that it
is constitutionally defective, or it might address squarely the issue of whether the due process clause requires that the prosecution prove the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable
doubt before a defendant can be convicted.
Richard A. Felsenthal

VI. POSTCONVICTION RELIEF PROCEDURE CLARIFIED
In Webb v. State" 4 the Supreme Court of South Carolina
used the summary affirmance of a trial court's grant of postconviction relief" 5 to explain the scope of review and other procedural aspects of appeals granted under the postconviction relief

112. Under the Thomas criteria the jury instructions delivered by the trial judge in
Davis were unconstitutionally confusing and contradictory. The judge charged that the
prosecution "must prove to you malice beyond a reasonable doubt," Record at 8, and
that the defendant "must prove these four elements [of self-defense] to you by the
greater weight of the testimony," Record at 11.
113. See supra note 24.
114. 281 S.C. 237, 314 S.E.2d 839 (1984).
115. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-10 (1976).
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statute. 116
The court in Webb stated, "The appropriate scope of review
is that 'any evidence' of probative value to support the post-conviction judge's factual findings is sufficient to uphold those findings on appeal. ' 117 The court pointed out that review under the
postconviction relief statute is a review on the merits, which occurs without oral argument. 118 Finally, the court stated that
when a petition for certiorari is granted under Rule 50(9),119 the
court will advance the petition on the docket, giving preference
to the appeal. 120 This is obviously advantageous to the individual applying for relief.
Frank L. Eppes

116. These appeals are granted under S.C. Sup. CT. R. 50(9)(Supp. 1984), the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.
117. 281 S.C. at 238, 314 S.E.2d at 839. The court cited Griffin v. Warden, 277 S.C.
288, 286 S.E.2d 145, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 942 (1982). South Carolina law in this regard
has been well settled since the decision in Townes Assoc., Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266
S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773 (1976), which stated that "[i]n an action at law, on appeal of a
case tried without a jury, the findings of fact of the judge will not be disturbed upon
appeal unless found to be without evidence which reasonably supports the judge's findings." Id. at 86, 221 S.E.2d at 775.
118. 281 S.C. at 238, 314 S.E.2d at 389. Under S.C. Sup. CT. R. 50(9)(f), in appeals
under the postconviction relief statute the court may allow oral argument at its
discretion.
119. See supra note 3.
120. 281 S.C. at 288, 314 S.E.2d at 839.
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